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stathis kouvelakis
SYRIZA’S  RISE  AND FALL 
Syriza won power in January 2015 as an anti-austerity party—the most 
advanced political opposition so far to the hardening deflationary poli-
cies of the Brussels–Berlin–Frankfurt axis. Six months later, the Tsipras 
government forced through the harshest austerity package Greece had yet 
seen. This trajectory was a predictable outcome of the contradiction embod-
ied in Syriza’s programme: reject austerity, but keep the euro. Why was 
Tsipras so incapable of envisaging a course inside the eu but outside the 
Eurozone, the position of Sweden, Denmark, Poland and half a dozen other 
European countries? 
First, one shouldn’t underestimate the popularity of the euro in the southern-periphery countries—Greece, Spain, Portugal—for whom joining the eu meant accessing political and economic modernity. For Greece, in particular, it meant 
being part of the West in a different way to that of the us-imposed post-
civil war regime. It seemed a guarantee of the new democratic course: 
after all, it’s only since 1974 that Greece has known a political regime 
similar to other Western countries, after decades of authoritarianism, 
military dictatorship and civil war. The European Community also 
offered the promise of combining prosperity with a social dimension, 
supposedly inherent to the project, which sealed the political com-
pact that emerged after the fall of the Junta. Joining the euro seemed 
the logical conclusion of that process. Having the same currency as 
the most advanced countries has a tremendous power over people’s 
imagination—carrying in your pocket the same currency as Germans 
or Dutch, even if you are a low-paid Greek worker or pensioner—which 
Interview: New Masses—13 
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those of us who’d been in favour of exiting the euro since the start of the 
crisis tended to underestimate. 
Even now, after five years of some of the hardest shock therapy ever 
imposed—and the first imposed on a Western European country—
public opinion is still split on the issue of the euro, although now with 
a much narrower majority in favour of staying in. This frame of mind 
also reveals a very strong subaltern mentality in Greek society, which 
probably goes back to the formation of the state in the 1830s—an ideol-
ogy that emanates from the Greek elites, who always felt inferior to their 
European counterparts and had to demonstrate how faithful they were; 
they always thought they owed something to the Western powers. And 
indeed, each time their power was threatened, Western intervention 
played a decisive role in securing the existing social order, more particu-
larly in the 1940s and the period leading to the 1967 military coup.
Second, in contrast to the position of Sweden, Denmark or the uk, 
for Greece quitting the euro would be extremely conflictual, because it 
would mean breaking with the neoliberal policies of the Memoranda. If 
you are serious about this, you have to be prepared for a confrontation. 
From 2012, when Syriza emerged as the largest opposition party, poised 
for government, it was clear that Tsipras didn’t want that fight, which is 
why he switched to a stance of staying in the Eurozone. Syriza’s original 
position was summed up by two slogans: ‘No sacrifice for the euro’ and 
‘The euro is not a fetish’, which left open the question of how far to go 
in confronting the Eurogroup and the Troika. But this line was shelved 
soon after the June 2012 elections.
In the summer of 2015 it was Tsipras who used the argument of 
fear—that exiting the euro would mean chaos. In early June, after the 
Eurogroup rejected the Greek terms, which had already been intended 
as a capitulation, the Syriza Finance Minister Euclid Tsakalotos was 
asked by Paul Mason what would happen if Greece left the euro. He 
replied that it would be a return to the 1930s—the rise of Nazism! 
Tsipras himself used the image of collective suicide. What such state-
ments reveal is that, for the Syriza leadership, exit was unthinkable—a 
black hole. It was outside their cognitive mapping, alien to their strategy 
which had already ruled out the possibility of an all-out confrontation. I 
think that’s the only thing that was clear in their minds. The main point 
of the ‘turn to realism’ taken by the leadership after losing the June 
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2012 elections by a narrow margin was to show that the option of exit 
had been definitively abandoned. Earlier, there had been an ambigu-
ity about going in that direction, and therefore a certain openness. But 
really it was dropped after the elections of June 2012, the implicit justi-
fication being that we shouldn’t scare the more moderate voters whose 
support was needed to win the next election.
You say that leaving the euro had to involve an all-out confrontation, but, 
on the contrary, Schäuble was offering to ease Greece’s way. He could see 
the Eurozone would be much more coherent without Greece, and offered 
concrete assistance.
Well, first, we don’t have enough information about what exactly hap-
pened, what the terms of Schäuble’s offer were and to what extent it 
represented the position of the German government as a whole. What 
we do know is that Schäuble said there were two possibilities—either 
swallow the Third Memorandum, or exit the euro, with which we will 
even offer some assistance—but it’s hard to believe that this was not to 
be accompanied by conditionalities. 
But surely this should have been explored?
Absolutely. That is exactly what we in the Left Platform said at the time.1 
In fact, one of the main arguments Tsipras used against us was that 
we were siding with Schäuble—they played on that hysterically during 
the entire summer of 2015. But it should have been explored. In fact, 
Panagiotis Lafazanis and others argued in the Cabinet in May that the 
government should send a representative to have informal talks with 
Schäuble, but Tsipras turned them down. He categorically refused to 
discuss the possibility. 
Tell us about the ideological formation of Syriza as a party. Did 
Eurocommunism play a dominant part?
Politically, there is no linear continuity between Eurocommunism and 
Syriza. The majority of Synaspismos members, who formed the bulk 
of Syriza, came from the orthodox Communist Party. Tsipras; Yannis 
1 The Left Platform was a bloc within Syriza led by Panagiotis Lafazanis, Minister 
for Energy in the first Tsipras Cabinet from January until July 2015. He and the lp’s 
25 other mps broke with the party in August 2015.
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Dragasakis; Synaspismos’s first leader, Maria Damanaki; the secretary 
until recently, Dimitris Vitsas—all these people came from the kke, 
which they left in 1991. The Syriza coalition, formed in 2004, included 
many other components—Trotskyist groups, Maoists, altermondialistes 
and so on—as well as the remnant Eurocommunists, the akoa. But 
the intellectual culture which permeated Synaspismos was dominated 
by traditional intellectuals from Eurocommunist backgrounds, and this 
had an impact. Indeed, the party’s theoretical institute is named after 
Nicos Poulantzas.
Could you explain in more detail the stages of Syriza’s evolution after the June 
2012 elections, when it emerged as the national opposition with 27 per cent of 
the vote?
After the 2012 elections there was a general perception that it was just a 
matter of time before Syriza took office, one way or another. The Tsipras 
leadership made very clear and, in a sense, very tough decisions in that 
summer of 2012, about the party’s line and about the type of party they 
wanted. First, they needed to turn a coalition of disparate organizations 
into a unified party; this was quite widely recognized, and there was no 
real disagreement about it. They also wanted to use the unification pro-
cess to transform the culture of the party and its organizational structure 
at a very deep level. Instead of a push to recruit people who’d been active 
in the social mobilizations of the period, the aim was to open the gates 
to the sort of people who want to join a party when they think it has 
a serious chance of accessing power—clientelist mentalities and habits 
are very deeply rooted in Greek society, including in the popular classes; 
there’s a type of micromanagement of social relations. 
These would be people who’d previously been in pasok and had seen it go 
down the drain?
Yes. This process also included bringing in figures associated with the 
political establishment. This wasn’t done to win votes, because these peo-
ple were completely discredited in electoral terms; it was a signal to the 
establishment: we are in the process of becoming a normal party. Again, 
these were people from pasok backgrounds, who had served in the 
governments of Simitis or Papandreou—there were not many of them, 
because it created quite a reaction inside Syriza. Panagiotis Kouroumblis, 
for example, who is now the Minister of the Interior and Administrative 
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Reconstruction; or Alexis Mitropoulos, Vice President of Parliament in 
the previous mandate; or Christos Spirtzis, the former President of the 
Technical Chamber of Greece and current Minister of Transport and 
Public Infrastructure, well known for his connections with business 
interests in the construction sector. Tsipras and Dragasakis built close 
ties with Louka Katseli, who had been a senior figure in pasok govern-
ments. Though she didn’t join Syriza, there was an official collaboration, 
and now she’s the Governor of the National Bank of Greece. This process 
was replicated at intermediate levels of the party. The Syriza leadership 
did everything they could to get these people on the electoral lists in 
2015—though with only partial success, because there were strong reac-
tions from the local branches and the regional executives.
Turning Syriza into a leader-centred party was the second aspect of 
the process. The aim was to move from a militant party of the left, 
with a strong culture of internal debate, heterogeneity, involvement in 
social movements and mobilizations, to a party with a passive mem-
bership which could be more easily manipulated by the centre, and 
keener to identify with the figure of the leader. It was striking that the 
two key party gatherings—the first national conference in November 
2012, the founding congress in July 2013—were both called at point-
blank notice; we had a month to prepare. Of course, things needed 
to move fast because of the political conjuncture, but these fast-track 
procedures were used to create bloated bodies that were much too 
large for effective decision-making. There were 3,500 delegates at the 
founding congress. The first Central Committee had 300 members, 
the second 200—and it was a fight reducing it to that. The leadership 
clearly wanted to erode the militant political culture and move to a top-
down electoral machine.
How did this mesh with the political realignment you’ve spoken about?
The inner-party restructuring went together with the rightward drift. 
From the summer of 2012 onwards, the position on the euro was trans-
formed into a constant display of fidelity to the Eurozone. This was 
expressed in Tsipras’s trips to mainstream institutions, mainly in the 
us—the Brookings Institute and so on—but also much more exclu-
sive places like the Ambrosetti Club, which played a crucial role in 
Italian politics during the 1970s and in the development of the ‘historic 
compromise’. It was in October 2013, at the lbj School of Public Affairs 
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in Austin, Texas, that he made the famous statement, ‘Greece should 
not exit the Eurozone: that would be a disaster for Europe’, which 
effectively shut down the debate. The drift was equally marked in rela-
tion to the debt. Eric Toussaint, who played a leading role on the Debt 
Audit Commission set up by Parliament Speaker Zoe Konstantopoulou, 
has confirmed that there was a clear shift by the Syriza leadership in the 
summer of 2012, when they reversed their previous position of repu-
diating the debt and mounting an international campaign against its 
legitimacy. The formulations in the party documents didn’t change, but 
it was the usual kind of double discourse: in the programme there are 
statements about socialism, no sacrifice for the euro, we will go forward 
whatever it takes, and so on; but these were no longer expressed publicly, 
especially not by Tsipras and the circle round him. 
Second, from 2012 onwards, the type of political practice favoured by the 
Tsipras leadership didn’t move beyond parliamentarism. It was clear that 
Syriza wanted to bring down Samaras’s coalition, but only through par-
liamentary tactics, focusing on the presidential elections in late 2014.2 
They didn’t want a strategy of popular mobilizations to push the pro-
cess forward. It’s true that the big wave of mobilizations in 2010, 2011, 
early 2012 had died down—precisely because the energies had now been 
diverted to the political level. But there was absolutely no perception of 
a defeat for those mobilizations at the time; the sense was just that we 
can’t achieve all that we want by occupying squares—we need a political 
and electoral alternative. At several points between 2013 and 2015 there 
were moments when mobilizations could have been relaunched: when 
Samaras shut down the public broadcasting company, ert, in June 2013; 
the murder of Pavlos Fyssas by Golden Dawn in September of that year; 
the transport workers’ strike in early 2013, and potentially the teachers’ 
strikes in June and September 2013 as well. 
At this point the Tsipras leadership also started building bridges to 
people in the core state apparatuses—military and diplomatic circles—
and began to indicate their loyalty to the fundamental tenets of the Greek 
state. His people made approaches to the more centrist wing of New 
Democracy, around Kostas Karamanlis; one outcome was the election of 
Prokopis Pavlopoulos as President of the Republic in February 2015, an 
emblematic figure of that grouping. The first meeting between Tsipras 
2 Parliament elects the Greek president with a qualified majority, which Samaras 
did not have.
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and Shimon Peres was in August 2012. Of course this had not been 
approved by any party body, nor would it have been at that time. It was 
also at this point that Tsipras brought various military and diplomatic 
figures into his close circle, who clearly oriented his approach to interna-
tional and geopolitical issues.
So Tsipras had complete autonomy from the party?
The operation was not totally successful. Tsipras never succeeded in 
doing what Pablo Iglesias has done for Podemos, where there isn’t a 
single deputy from the left wing of the party. Iglesias has succeeded 
in totally excluding the wing around the Anticapitalistas from the par-
liamentary party—people like Teresa Rodríguez and the opposition at 
the Vistalegre assembly, who didn’t agree with his extremely top-down 
model for the party. There was much more resistance to that in Syriza, 
because it had been only partially transformed—until last summer, it 
remained to a large extent a party of activists who had spent their lives 
in the Greek radical left. 
But the key positions were held by the old Synaspismos leadership, and 
yes, they became completely autonomous even from the leading party 
bodies. Tsipras’s personal staff were beyond the control of anyone in the 
party. So was the Commission for the Programme—essentially domi-
nated by the Commission for the Economy, led by Yannis Dragasakis. 
He is an almost Balzacian figure, obscure and public at the same time; 
a man always moving in the corridors, or behind closed doors, but at 
the same time enjoying the image of being very serious and reasonable, 
when the reality is the exact opposite. He was supposedly in charge of 
the Commission elaborating Syriza’s programme, with the result that by 
the early autumn of 2014, when elections were looming, Syriza had no 
manifesto. The reason was political, not technical: Dragasakis wanted 
his hands completely free. He knew he couldn’t put the programme he 
really wanted down on paper, because the party wouldn’t accept it—but 
he was the most open in saying the only option was improved manage-
ment of the Memoranda framework.
What was his political background?
Dragasakis was a senior figure in the Greek Communist Party (kke), 
who entered the coalition government with New Democracy in 1989—
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he was in the Ministry of Economics. He eventually used the connections 
he had with the nomenklatura in Eastern European countries to facili-
tate business arrangements between Greek entrepreneurs and the new 
economic elites emerging there in the 1990s. So he had close relations 
with Greek business circles, especially bankers. The Greek economic 
establishment considered Dragasakis a point-man in Syriza they could 
trust—which was certainly not the case with Tsipras, whom they didn’t 
know at all. Tsipras had been a second-rank figure in Synaspismos until 
he was chosen out of the blue by Alekos Alavanos in 2008 and offered 
the co-leadership, in an attempt to reinvigorate the party.
Nevertheless, Tsipras was the key figure in the evolution of Syriza?
Yes, absolutely. In fact Dragasakis had stepped down from the Party 
Secretariat in 2010, when things seemed to be stagnating. It was Tsipras 
who brought him back and put him in charge of the Commission for the 
Economy, although in reality Dragasakis, despite the degree he holds, 
knows nothing about economics. But the political responsibility was in 
the hands of Tsipras. That is crystal clear.
So how did the Thessaloniki Programme of September 2014 come about? 
Everyone knew that elections were likely in the next few months, so Syriza 
desperately needed a programme. A 150-page document was circulated 
during the summer, supposedly drafted by Dragasakis, but actually just 
a copy-and-paste of documents by different party commissions—it was a 
disaster. So an emergency programme was drafted very hastily, to be pre-
sented at the annual Thessaloniki International Fair in September—it’s 
a custom for Greek political leaders to make programmatic statements 
there. The Left Platform fought hard, and on several issues the Group of 
53, the left of the majority bloc, pushed in the same direction. As a result, 
the Thessaloniki Programme foretold the coming disaster. On the one 
hand, a set of commitments that clearly broke with austerity politics: 
nationalization of banks, renegotiation of the debt with a large write-off, 
restoration of the minimum wage and the labour legislation scrapped 
by the Memoranda; an end to the over-taxation imposed in recent years, 
especially on low- and middle-income households; development of pub-
lic employment; restoration of electricity to households that had been 
cut off; extra meals in schools, and so on. 
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But the other side of the coin was that all measures that entailed a fiscal 
cost were meant to be implemented within the framework of a balanced 
budget, and without new taxation—especially not on capital. Some of the 
demands, like public-sector employment, were supposed to be financed 
with subsidies from the eu—which presupposed an agreement with 
the other side. So it was clear, if you read the programme carefully, that 
the actual line of the leadership was that of ‘honourable compromise’, 
a term Dragasakis had already elaborated. The contradiction inherent 
in proclaiming a middle ground between the Memoranda and what 
were, in principle, Syriza’s commitments, was already embedded in the 
Thessaloniki Programme.
The non-accountable power structures of the eu had expanded and hardened 
between 2010 and 2015—compulsory fiscal targets and structural adjustment 
for all, not just the Troika countries. So the opponent that Greek and European 
lefts confront is extremely powerful, highly mobilized and well-armed in terms 
of its own programme and the tools at its disposal. Was there any recognition 
or analysis of this by the Tsipras government?
Yes and no. One reason why the Syriza leadership started backtracking 
in 2012, I think, is that they understood that if they had won the election, 
it would have been a confrontation that they couldn’t control. Before 
that, they had just been surfing on the dynamic of the situation. Despite 
the talk about smashing neoliberalism and so on, when it came to the 
real thing they got scared. That was the moment of truth. At the same 
time, they had a lot of illusions about what they could get from Europe. 
When Tsipras went to address what was, in a way, the real audience—the 
representatives of ruling circles in Europe and the us—the logic of what 
he was saying was: ‘Look, I’ll lay down my radicalism, of which you are 
rightly afraid, but in which I don’t genuinely believe. I see things differ-
ently now, and I’m ready to be a nice boy, much more reasonable than 
you think—but I should get something in return.’ He really believed he 
could get something—that was clear. 
The result, you could say, was objectively the worst political betrayal per-
petrated by any contemporary left-wing force—certainly in Europe. But 
‘betrayal’ is an inadequate explanation. It has moralistic and psychologi-
cal overtones, which are not particularly useful for political analysis. It 
also suggests that things went according to a plan, which is not true in 
54 nlr 97
this case. The plan when they took office in January 2015 was: ‘We’ll 
try—quite hard—to find a good compromise, and then hope to move 
forward from there.’ They were then taken aback by their complete 
impotence and inability to get anything done. One could call it naivety, 
though that’s not a useful term either, for some of the same reasons. 
Rather than ‘naivety’, it’s the state of mind of a left which has already 
accepted a subaltern position. An illustration: in April 2015, when at the 
lenders’ insistence Tsakalotos had been substituted for Varoufakis in 
the Greek negotiating team, he was asked by Amélie Poinssot, a highly 
informed French journalist at Mediapart, what had surprised him most 
as a minister. Tsakalotos replied that he had prepared very thoroughly 
for his first trip to Brussels and delivered a carefully thought-out paper, 
but was disappointed by the low level of debate—‘The other finance min-
isters just recited rules and procedures!’ He was living in some kind of 
Habermasian dreamworld, presupposing a will to find common ground, 
a ‘win-win deal’—that was the jargon of Syriza’s first few months. They 
lacked not just the perception of class antagonism but the elementary 
realism that any political figure needs in order to survive.
Didn’t Varoufakis come out with similar statements? 
Varoufakis is a more complex figure. As we now know, he was doing 
things behind the scenes that showed he had an awareness of the need to 
go beyond what was being said in public. At the same time, he signed up 
to the 20 February 2015 agreement, constantly defended it and was the 
first to make statements, as early as February 2015, saying Greece should 
adopt 70 per cent of the Memorandum. He bears a lot of responsibility 
for what happened. Nevertheless, he had a clearer perception of the situ-
ation and was keen to adopt a more confrontational attitude within that 
framework—and in fact this was why Tsipras chose him. Tsipras sensed 
that, even if it was pure theatre, some such stance was necessary if only 
for purposes of legitimation, or possibly for getting some concessions, 
and that Dragasakis would be quite incapable of playing that role. He 
needed a more flamboyant figure like Varoufakis.
To seek the good compromise?
Yes, to pursue that chimera.
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The ecb’s first move in the week Syriza entered office was to tighten conditions 
of lending to Greek banks—seizing the Greek economy by the throat—while 
capital fled the country. What’s your assessment of the government’s response? 
What could it have done?
Institute capital controls—it’s obvious. James Galbraith, who was part of 
a small team set up by Varoufakis to work on scenarios and proposals, 
said in an important interview last summer that he had suggested insti-
tuting capital controls to Tsipras at the time. He said Tsipras categorically 
rejected the idea, because ‘it would have put Greece’s membership of the 
Eurozone in danger’.
Cyprus had enforced capital controls for nearly two years and was still in 
the Eurozone.
Exactly. It was clear that Tsipras’s circle didn’t want to take any measure 
of self-defence. It’s true that instituting capital controls means your euro 
is not exactly equivalent to the others. But it would have been a vital step. 
There was a massive bank run underway—savings were flowing out of 
the country, and the liquidity of the banking system relied exclusively on 
the emergency mechanism of the ela once the main financial channel 
had been cut off by the ecb in early February. The whole atmosphere 
in those first few weeks of February was extremely confrontational. The 
negotiations were very tough. In Athens people had started taking to 
the streets in support of Syriza; there was even some solidarity in other 
European cities. A scenario of confrontation still seemed credible, but 
it was being undermined because of the pressure on the Greek bank-
ing system. Capital controls could have stopped that—and avoided the 
capitulation of the 20 February agreement, when Syriza accepted the 
extension of the Memorandum. They tried to sell it as a compromise—
to win time. This was bullshit, of course; they had already turned down 
elementary self-defence measures that were coming not only from the 
ranks of the Left Platform—we’d been calling for capital controls from 
the outset—but even from people within their own team.
With the 20 February agreement Syriza abandoned its position of repudiating 
the Troika’s second Memorandum and instead extended it for four months, 
through to 30 June 2015, promising to honour all payments to the lenders; on 
the other hand, the €7.2bn bailout funds specified by the Memorandum would 
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only be released if Greece implemented all its measures—pension cuts, redun-
dancies, etc. It was never quite clear at the time what Tsipras and Varoufakis 
were negotiating for in that first three-week period. Did their demands shift?
They were negotiating what they called a ‘bridge programme’, which 
would take them to June. The hope was that it wouldn’t be accompanied 
by the same conditions. They wanted to win time until the summer, 
because they knew the debt repayments would be lower after that—the 
bulk of the repayments for 2015 were due between February and August. 
Varoufakis’s tactic was one of permanent negotiations, through which 
the iron cage of the Memorandum would gradually be loosened. He 
was serious about pushing the game of chicken to the farthest possible 
limit, because he genuinely believed that Schäuble and the Eurogroup 
would make substantial concessions, that the ideological cost for them 
would be too great. But this completely overlooked the asymmetry of the 
situation—behind the seeming sophistication of all those game theories, 
you find a lack of elementary political realism.
Naturally, Schäuble and the other finance ministers stuck to the letter of the 
20 February agreement: not a penny of the €7.2bn ‘bailout’ loan until they 
had seen the measures of the Memorandum fully implemented. Yet the Syriza 
government kept up its interest repayments?
Yes. Tsipras never succeeded in getting any money from the Eurozone 
during this whole period. That’s why Syriza appropriated all the cash 
reserves of the public agencies—hospitals, schools, municipalities, 
universities—to hand over to the imf and ecb, as each month’s interest 
payments fell due. And so the €7.2 billion was paid exclusively out of 
domestic reserves; Greece was the only country in the world to repay its 
public debt that way. No Greek leader had done that before—although 
of course neither Papandreou nor Samaras had been denied the bailout 
funds. But it’s instructive that Tsipras preferred to hand over that money 
rather than contemplate a rupture.
Schäuble said of Tsipras at the time of the February 2015 agreement: ‘I’d like 
to see how he sells this at home.’ How did he?
With a wink and a nod. The discourse of Tsipras and his supporters 
served to suggest: ‘This was imposed on us against our will, we did our 
best, there was no other option. But since it’s against our beliefs, we 
kouvelakis: Interview 57
will deploy all the inventiveness of the descendants of Ulysses to cir-
cumvent and undermine the conditions, to cheat in some positive way 
within the constraints. Yes, we formally approved them, but deep within 
ourselves, we don’t believe in the documents we signed.’ This is the 
official narrative: ‘This is a coup; we might have made mistakes, but 
essentially we are victims.’ Tsipras said as much to Costas Lapavitsas 
in April 2015, just after Varoufakis had sent the second list of reforms, 
which included measures that would have a sharp recessionary effect. 
Lapavitsas pointed this out to Tsipras, who replied: ‘Look, we say we’ll 
do that, but do you really think we will?’ When the Eurogroup said the 
Greeks were not serious, there was an element of truth in it. It’s the cun-
ning of the subaltern who says, ‘Yes, of course’, but then cheats. Tsipras 
was playing that game. This was how he sold the capitulation to the 
electorate in September 2015.
How would you describe Syriza’s relations with the Greek media?
This is a key point. We use the term diaploki—literally, ‘interconnection’ 
or ‘interweaving’—to describe the collusion of private and public inter-
ests, at the geometrical centre of which is the media. Of course this is 
a much broader, probably global, phenomenon. The Greek tv channels 
and newspapers are owned by businessmen who do business with the 
state and have direct, privileged relations with politicians. Needless to 
say, the media were massively hostile to Syriza during its rise. The 2012 
election-campaign coverage had a Latin American atmosphere, with 
the tv stations broadcasting a golpista message—this is not a legitimate 
governing party, we will do anything to prevent it from gaining power. 
The level of symbolic violence was incredible. The tone of the public 
broadcaster, ert, was more controlled, but it has always been run by the 
successive governments—co-managed, if you like, by New Democracy 
and pasok. In order to get a job there, even as a cleaner, you had to be 
on one of the parties’ lists. This is perfectly normal in Greece; it applies 
to most of the public sector. 
The key figure in Syriza’s media strategy has been Tsipras’s closest col-
laborator, Nikos Pappas. Pappas’s father was a leading figure in the kke 
(Interior), playing an important role in the student insurrection in 1973; 
he became a full-time party worker after the fall of the Junta, always on 
the right of the party, very Europeanist. In the 1990s his son was active 
in the Synaspismos Youth, where he met Tsipras; they’re the same age. 
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He studied economics in Scotland and got a job in the party apparatus 
when he returned to Athens. Pappas was essentially put in charge of the 
dirty work. He managed to exploit the media magnates’ delicate rela-
tion to the law and the banks. Many of these outfits never paid their 
taxes—they owe a lot of money to the state. Even public broadcasting 
never followed legal procedures—there was no tender process. Their 
enterprises are very poorly managed, none is truly profitable; they owe 
billions to the banks. So a government can easily blackmail these people, 
threaten to cut their credit lines and so on. They knew that if Syriza got 
into office they could be under threat. But Syriza also wanted a modus 
vivendi, and Pappas quickly started making deals. ‘You owe money, what 
you’re doing is illegal; I have information that you’re on the Lagarde 
List’—that is, with undeclared Swiss bank accounts—‘So: you will hire 
ten people I trust, and your media will say X and Y.’ This sort of thing has 
become totally institutionalized. Striking a deal with the media was part 
of forging a stable and permanent arrangement with the Greek bour-
geoisie. Politically speaking, that’s the centre of this whole enterprise.
But haven’t the private tv channels remained absolutely vituperative?
Not really. The shift came in 2014 with the European and regional elec-
tions, in which Syriza triumphed. After that there was little doubt it 
would win the next general election. From that moment on, the attitude 
of the main private media changed. The line now was: Tsipras is more 
reasonable than people thought, but he needs to get rid of Syriza’s irre-
mediable radical wing, particularly the Left Platform. The same line was 
taken up by the international media.
Meanwhile the ert had been shut down by Samaras in the summer of 2013?
Completely—in a matter of hours. They announced it at five in the after-
noon and closed it at nine, I think. The broadcasting ended, but the 
riot police only came in to evacuate the building in November. So the 
building was occupied for several months and became a buzzing centre 
for all sorts of mobilizations, concerts, demonstrations. The employees 
set up an alternative tv channel, which moved online after the police 
shut down the transmitters. It was extraordinary: a huge central building 
permanently occupied by its workers, who were developing an alterna-
tive information model. If Syriza had had the political will, they could 
have turned that into something that would have changed the dynamics 
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of the situation—but they didn’t. Lafazanis was the only senior Syriza 
figure who visited the building every day. 
In April 2015 Syriza reopened the ert and re-hired most of the people 
who had been sacked, but they reverted to the old model—a broad-
casting company controlled by the state. The figure they appointed to 
run it, Lambis Tagmatarchis, was an ornament of the corrupt pasok 
media establishment during the Simitis and Papandreou years. There 
was no Troika intervention to make them appoint him. It was a totally 
independent decision.
What positive aspects of its programme did the Syriza government implement 
between January and July 2015? 
Very few. There was an unprecedentedly low level of legislative activity. 
No more than ten or twelve bills were passed in that first period. Most 
were positive, but they were very limited: a minimal package to deal 
with the humanitarian crisis, about one-sixth of the package announced 
in the Thessaloniki programme, including reconnection of electric-
ity, but targeting only the most desperate cases; the €5 entry ticket to 
go to hospital was scrapped—a widely hated Memorandum measure. 
High-security prisons were abolished, which was positive; reform of the 
nationality code as well. Tax arrears could be paid in a hundred monthly 
payments—the arrears are gigantic, about €90 billion, or half of gdp—
but this measure was partly revoked by the Third Memorandum. In a 
few cases, Left Platform ministers could pursue some initiatives. For 
instance, Lafazanis blocked privatization of land around Piraeus and of 
the national power company.
What role did the Left Platform play in public criticism of the leadership?
In my opinion, we didn’t do what we should have done. Because the Left 
Platform’s best-known figures were in the Cabinet, they were absorbed 
by their ministerial responsibilities and couldn’t play the same public 
political role they had before. We tried to substitute for them by promot-
ing other people who had more freedom to express themselves, but it 
wasn’t easy. However, all the internal debates during that period were 
very public: it was headline news if the Left Platform’s websites criticized 
government decisions, which we did—we were open about what we 
thought of the situation at each stage. We attacked the 20 February 
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agreement ferociously on the Central Committee, and made it clear that 
we wouldn’t accept any surrender.
The Central Committee was convened only three times between January 
and July—the last meeting, after the capitulation, was a total fiasco. But 
the amendments of the Left Platform got 40 per cent of votes in the 
first meeting, and 44 per cent in the second, which meant other cur-
rents were supporting our positions. These amendments were proper 
texts, articulating our overall disagreement with what the government 
was doing. Our approach was to try to bring the left of the majority bloc 
with us. This included part of the Group of 53, but also figures like Zoe 
Konstantopoulou, Manolis Glezos, the Maoists; even people like Yiannis 
Milios, who were anti-capitalist but hostile to any discussion about leav-
ing the euro. So the Left Platform acted as a pole of attraction, especially 
among the rank and file—but the party itself didn’t play a significant 
role. The Left Platform didn’t react to the marginalization of the party 
as it should have done. We should have put forward our own alternative 
programme. We did agree in April that we would finalize a text, and 
Lapavitsas had started working on it, but the Left Platform leadership 
never gave the green light. And then we were overtaken by events in 
June, and the lead-up to the referendum.
What were the programme’s main points?
It would have been a concrete road map articulated around the four meas-
ures we have consistently put forward since the start of the crisis: default 
on the debt, nationalize the banks, impose capital controls and prepare 
for an alternative currency, in that order. It would also have involved 
taking unilateral legislative measures: re-establishing labour legislation, 
instituting a special tax on capital—to demonstrate a clear political will. 
The green light never came, I think, because this would have meant the 
Left Platform’s four ministers leaving the Cabinet. But they should have 
been prepared to leave it. The Tsipras leadership was ruthless, whereas 
we were going by the book—arguing in the branches and on the Central 
Committee, publishing material on our websites, organizing events. But 
they had marginalized the party and were not accountable to anyone. 
The decision-making process was sealed inside the Cabinet: actually 
not even the entire Cabinet, but informal circles around Tsipras and 
Dragasakis, which we called the ‘para-centre of power’. It was easier for 
me to be more outspoken, to push the boundaries of what could be said, 
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as I had no position in the government. But we should have opened up 
fronts elsewhere, waged an unconventional war. 
It’s true that this would have needed broader support, beyond the party. 
I’ve studied quite a few Latin American situations for points of com-
parison and reflection. In Chile, where the left of the Unidad Popular 
did try to mobilize beyond the party apparatuses, a journal like Chile 
Hoy played an important role in regrouping people from the left of the 
Socialist Party with social movements, elements of the Christian radical 
left, of the far left and so on. These kinds of possibilities are necessary 
for an unconventional strategy that can really destabilize the leadership. 
I don’t want to minimize our collective responsibility, or even mine 
personally; but others are answerable for this, too. The far-left Antarsya 
coalition has some potentially very interesting activists and could have 
contributed, but they were too sectarian. To sectarians, those closest to 
them always appear as the biggest obstacle, so rather than trying to build 
something with us—and, when the final confrontation was approach-
ing, trying to unblock the situation—they spent their time denouncing 
the Left Platform more fiercely than they did the Syriza leadership. And 
of course the extreme sectarianism of the kke contributed to the nega-
tive developments from 2010 onwards. We could have been spared the 
coalition with the Independent Greeks if, in 2012, the kke had accepted 
a minimally unitary line with Syriza. That would have regrouped all the 
left forces that emerged from the communist matrix in a new political 
dynamic, which in those circumstances would have had real potential. 
This is exactly what the kke didn’t want, because it would have opened 
up a dynamic that would go beyond anything they could figure out.
Another task was to help clarify the real economic costs—and benefits—of 
quitting the euro system, so Greeks could make an informed decision.
Yes. I’m not an Althusserian, but in this case the notion of the episte-
mological obstacle is valid. The mantra of left Europeanism, the belief in 
a ‘good euro’, blocks any understanding of what the alternatives might 
be. A level of technical expertise is obviously necessary here; even if this 
means it’s not easily available for wider public use, the knowledge of 
its existence acts powerfully as an argument in public opinion. That’s 
necessary, too—it must not remain a discussion between experts. That 
was the responsibility of the Left Platform, and our record is mixed. We 
did a lot of the work, in the sense that everyone knew from the start of 
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the crisis that we thought the solution had to involve euro exit and an 
all-out confrontation with the Troika and the Greek oligarchy. We fought 
on this basis consistently from 2010 onwards. But we failed to provide 
a properly elaborated alternative vision and a counter-programme that 
would have triggered a broader public debate.
How clear was the Left Platform at the time about Tsipras’s position during 
this period?
From the outset we knew that capitulation was on the table as an option. 
Our calculation was that the Eurogroup and Troika might want to humil-
iate Tsipras so badly that even he would say no—or that the conditions 
could be created in which he would have to, because they were going too 
far. But we misjudged the temporality of the process: the war of attrition 
that the government resorted to, with those pseudo-negotiations, lasted 
months. After the 20 February agreement it imposed a climate of passiv-
ity and exhaustion. We also underestimated the concrete and symbolic 
effects of seizing the reserves of public institutions to repay the debt 
until there was nothing left in the public coffers. With no money left, I 
don’t know what we could have done, even if we had taken control of the 
situation. We should have reacted at that moment, but we didn’t. The 
closer we got to the critical, cathartic moment in the sequence, which 
was the referendum and the capitulation that followed, the less we could 
control the situation.
When the referendum was announced, we thought our approach had 
been vindicated. We’d wagered that, reaching deadlock, Tsipras would 
eventually take an initiative of this sort and that it would liberate energies. 
This is exactly what happened during that crazy week: the referendum 
unleashed a radicalization across society which expressed itself in the 
vote. By late June, Tsipras was ready to accept the Eurogroup’s ultima-
tum, but there was a rebellious mood everywhere—within the party, but 
also outside it—and he couldn’t capitulate without at least a simulacrum 
of a battle. That was what the referendum was for him. But he hadn’t 
anticipated how confrontational it would be, with capital controls, the 
banks closed, people queueing to get a maximum of €60 per day out 
of the atms.
The rally of Friday 3 July in Athens—before the Sunday of the 
referendum—was one of the biggest in Greek history. It was extremely 
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impressive not only in numbers but in its combative spirit and mood. 
The movement of the squares had also attracted masses of people, but 
the mood then was more dispersed and less militant. Now it was a polit-
icized crowd, asking for a battle. That evening, 3 July, Tsipras walked 
across from the prime minister’s office, Maximus Mansion, which is 
close to Syntagma Square. When he entered the avenue leading to the 
square, the crowds stretched for kilometres, up to the Hilton Hotel. An 
immense crowd carried him to Syntagma, in an accidental Perón-style tri-
umph. The result was that Tsipras got extremely scared—physically. He 
started perspiring, and cut the speech he had prepared by three-quarters. 
It was to be a forty-minute talk and he spoke for just eight, improvising 
on how much the Greeks love Europe and so on. The atmosphere was 
exactly what the Left Platform’s approach had aimed at. But it came too 
late, both in terms of the material possibilities that existed at the time 
and in the sense that, for Tsipras, this was really an epilogue, to prepare 
for the final capitulation—a way of saying that he had played all possible 
cards and demonstrated that nothing else could be done. 
The Syriza leadership was divided over the referendum? 
Yes. The most corrupt or rightist elements in the Cabinet were against 
it. Dragasakis was fiercely opposed; Stathakis spoke against it; Panousis, 
Interior Minister at the time, was also against it. They thought the risk 
was two-fold. First, they could see the situation getting out of control and 
Tsipras being overwhelmed, even though they understood that was not 
his intention. Second, they knew capitulation was coming and thought 
a referendum would only increase its costs. I talked to some intellectu-
als close to Dragasakis who issued a text in the Greek press at that time, 
calling on Tsipras to cancel the referendum, and that was their line of 
thought. So, five minutes in the mind of Alexis Tsipras: the situation was 
deadlocked, the 30 June deadline was upon him, he had already made 
his best attempt at a capitulation with the 47-page Greek proposal that he 
submitted at the end of May; the Eurogroup had rejected it and replied 
with the Juncker package, essentially demanding that Greece comply 
with every Troika instruction. It was a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum. And 
clearly, inside the party the signs were that people were not ready to 
accept this. The same went for public opinion more generally: Syriza 
mps and local branches were getting messages from far beyond activist 
circles. People were really angry with the Eurogroup negotiations, thou-
sands were signing up to calls on social networks saying, ‘Tsipras, come 
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back now! Take the next flight!’ The idea of a referendum was in the air, 
floated by government ministers, actually—not particularly by us.
Hadn’t the idea first come from George Papandreou, back in 2011?
Yes, in a way. But also Tsakalotos and others had said, ‘Why not a refer-
endum on austerity, if it comes to it?’ As for Tsipras, the one certainty we 
have is that he only thinks about tactics. There are two possibilities, not 
mutually exclusive. The first is that he thought he could get what he said: 
a further sign of popular support to improve his position in the negotia-
tions. The question posed would be sufficiently vague—No or Yes to the 
Juncker package—that it wouldn’t raise the issue of rupture with the 
euro. He must have imagined this would take place in a relatively con-
trolled and calm atmosphere—clearly he completely underestimated the 
effect of bank closures, shortage of currency and so on, when the ecb 
upped the pressure by cutting off the emergency funding mechanism 
to the banks. The tension rose suddenly that Monday, 29 June, with 
the banks closing. At that point it was clear, I think, that Tsipras either 
wanted the Yes to win, or a very narrow margin for the No. 
The second possibility is that he had already taken the decision to sign 
up to the Third Memorandum, but needed a display of bravery up to 
the last moment, to legitimize it—so that he could say, ‘You see, I’ve 
used all the weapons I had, and I couldn’t get more than this; there is 
no alternative.’ So, those were the intentions. The reality was that he 
was totally overwhelmed by the dynamic unleashed by the referendum. 
He was the sorcerer’s apprentice—he had liberated forces that then had 
their own autonomous movement. In a few hours he demolished all the 
bridges and the consensus-oriented approach he had been building for 
three years. Perhaps the most useful thing in Paul Mason’s politically 
misleading YouTube documentary, #ThisIsACoup—of course it wasn’t 
a coup!—is the footage of how shocked and scared the key government 
figures were when they saw the referendum results, the scale of the Oxi 
vote. It speaks volumes about what these people had in mind. And the 
contrast between this and the jubilant Varoufakis who, in his politically 
unreliable way, was nevertheless ready to go one step further. In the end 
Varoufakis didn’t accept the capitulation—he was not ready for that, 
despite the fact that he was against exiting the euro, or at least extremely 
reluctant to consider that move. This is why he left.
kouvelakis: Interview 65
After the extraordinary 61 per cent No vote in the 5 July referendum, not just 
Tsipras but almost all the Syriza deputies voted to capitulate—only two Syriza 
mps voted against, with eight abstentions. Did that come as a surprise? Was 
there any retribution against them from the public, after such a huge vote?
Not such a surprise. But yes, it created an enormous trauma. Activists I 
spoke to in the district of Fokida, near Delphi, a relatively impoverished 
area, told me that in small villages Syriza representatives were leaving 
their homes at 5am, and returning very late, to avoid meeting anyone. 
They were ashamed. In Athens, party people didn’t turn up to their jobs 
for days—they couldn’t face their colleagues. Well-known figures didn’t 
dare go shopping in their own neighbourhoods. Greece became a crazy 
country in which, on 6 July, we were asked to forget what had happened 
the day before; in which the Prime Minister met with the vanquished 
side and agreed to all their terms! From 14 July onwards, after the final 
Eurogroup meeting, the party started to disintegrate, with the mem-
bership leaving en masse. Syriza is now a shadow of its former self. It 
had never been a mass party, properly speaking—it peaked at 35,000 
members. As a point of comparison, New Democracy has 400,000 reg-
istered members; pasok had even more before 2009. The majority of 
the activists have left; those who stayed in Syriza either have some kind 
of governmental position or they work for the party. It has completely 
lost its trade-union base, which joined Popular Unity. The only social 
sector where Syriza had nearly no losses was academia—an effect of 
statization, ideological decomposition and the mad Europhilia which is 
part of the symbolic status of a Greek university professor.
Syriza voted through the Memorandum in August. Tsipras immediately 
called an election for 20 September. Given the referendum result, why did 
Popular Unity do so badly in the election?
First, we should have acted quicker. We had a closed meeting of the Left 
Current, the main component of the Left Platform, on 16 July, and took 
the decision to leave. We thought it would strengthen our position if we 
waited until the Memorandum was actually passed before we left—to 
say: this is one thing that can never be accepted. But it was a tactical 
mistake to delay until August, once the elections were called. Tsipras 
of course manipulated the calendar to call snap elections the day after 
the Memorandum was passed, so we had only four weeks in which 
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to launch a new political formation. The electorate hardly knew what 
Popular Unity was. People could identify Lafazanis as a figure, but in 
the polling stations they were saying, ‘What’s this?’, and many were sur-
prised when they realized he had left Syriza. Another key factor is that, 
even after the break, we didn’t present any developed alternative pro-
gramme. There was a lack of confidence on the part of Popular Unity’s 
core leadership; they still behaved as if they were Syriza’s internal oppo-
sition. They hadn’t sufficiently liberated themselves from that line of 
thought and practice.
That’s one set of reasons. Another was the prevailing demoralization. 
People who were totally opposed to what had happened just stayed 
home on election day. Turnout was an historic low. Tsipras won with 
only 1.9 million votes. By comparison, pasok had got over 3 million 
in 2009. Popular Unity is not a negligible force. Membership is over 
5,000, with a diverse militant core: the bulk of the forces come from 
the Left Platform, but there is also a current from Syriza’s Group of 
53, including important figures in campaigns for migrants and social 
rights, and the so-called Althusserians of Antarsya. But it’s weakened 
by the fact that it has no representation in parliament, which means the 
media isn’t forced to take us into account. Of course it entails financial 
consequences; the party is much weaker in terms of resources than in 
militant power. Still, even on occasions like the recent anniversary of 
the Polytechnic insurrection or the social protests, Popular Unity has 
proved it has a greater mobilizing capacity than the rump Syriza—New 
Syriza, we might call it.
What are the terms of the Third Memorandum, which New Syriza is now 
pushing through?
Greece is now a semi-protectorate: a bigger Kosovo. There is a new 
austerity package, with further cuts and taxes—to an economy that has 
already lost a quarter of its gdp. The Greek government has lost any real 
legislative power, since any bill has to be approved by the Quartet before 
being submitted to the Parliament. On the side of the executive power, 
the tax-collecting body, the General Secretariat of Public Revenue, is 
now fully ‘independent’ of the elected government and is in reality 
controlled by appointees of Brussels. Decrees issued by the Secretariat 
have an equal value to decisions of the Cabinet—this is written in the 
Memorandum. Then there’s the Council for Fiscal Discipline, with five 
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members, functioning along the same lines. They are unaccountable 
to any governmental authority, closely monitored by the Quartet and 
can impose cuts on any expenditure if they suspect there might be a 
deviation from fiscal targets, which demand a 3.5 per cent surplus from 
2018. Deprived of its levers, the Greek state is also being stripped of its 
remaining assets. The airports have already been sold to a German com-
pany, of which the major stakeholder is the federal state of Hesse. The 
banks have essentially been sold to vulture funds. Home repossessions 
will start this February. Syriza is very proud to have obtained measures 
which they say will protect 25 per cent of mortgages; meaning that 75 per 
cent will be opened up to recuperation by the banks.
The Tsipras government is trying to win time by dragging out negotia-
tions, especially over pension reform. This is an explosive issue, because 
pensions are already very low in Greece; yet for hundreds of thousands 
of households, often containing two or three generations, they are the 
only source of income. Syriza is playing with the deadlines imposed by 
the Quartet—it was December, then January; every new deadline is pre-
sented as some kind of victory. Then there is agriculture. Greece is the 
last Western European country with a significant primary sector: about 
10 per cent of the active population are small-scale farmers. There is a 
deliberate plan to eliminate this sector through over-taxation, to restruc-
ture, concentrate and open it up for agribusiness, which is almost 
nonexistent in Greece. The sort of small-scale Greek capitalism that has 
existed for decades is being eliminated in services, too. The coastline is 
being sold for next to nothing, either for real-estate operations or to the 
large-scale tourist industry—the tourist sector in Greece is still mainly 
dominated by family firms. The goal is a Greece of cheap labour, non-
existent social rights and a few ruins and beaches. A mixture of Bulgaria 
and Tunisia, with the political regime of a Kosovo, as I said. This is the 
future that Syriza is preparing.
So has Syriza now stepped into the shoes of pasok, as the representative 
Greek party of the neoliberal centre-left?
pasok was once something much better than that. For a long time peo-
ple associated it with important social gains—the welfare state built in 
the 1980s, and the deep democratization of that time. Unlike in other 
European countries, the late 70s and early 80s were a good time in 
Greece. There was a real confidence that we could follow our own path 
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of social change and national independence. It was a creative period; 
the advances in fields like labour law and education were among the 
most progressive in Europe. There was a sense of optimism that lasted 
for decades—even in the 2000s it still meant something, despite the 
corruption. Corruption also produces corrupt subjects; pasok corrupted 
Greek society and the popular classes, and the effect was devastating. 
But then pasok was eaten up by the Memoranda. They are like Molochs, 
the Memoranda: they constantly need new sacrifices. In that respect, 
Syriza took over from the pasok of George Papandreou Jr, as the next 
sacrificial victim. 
To whom would you compare Tsipras now, as a political figure? What’s the 
difference between him and Renzi, for example?
Renzi doesn’t come from the left; he never claimed to be a radical fig-
ure. Perhaps one could compare Tsipras to Achille Occhetto, the Italian 
Communist Party leader who liquidated the whole tradition of the party. 
Occhetto visited nato headquarters in Brussels and said, ‘This is the 
centre of world peace.’ He visited Wall Street and said, ‘This is the temple 
of civilization.’ These are things no social democrat, or even a conserva-
tive, would ever say. The Italian Marxist Constanzo Preve made the point 
that former left-wingers who disintegrate internally tend to stop believ-
ing in anything. Having taken decisions that put them in a position in 
which their whole framework of values has to collapse, they come to 
do things no bourgeois or right-wing social-democratic politician would 
contemplate. Like the former Comecon nomenklaturists, who led the 
most ferocious neoliberal reforms: when your inner world collapses, 
you become a bearer of nihilism—you will do anything in order to stay 
in power. Tsipras, who built his entire political position on a pledge to 
abolish the Memoranda, now becomes their loyal servant. 
In political nihilism, astonishing things can happen. The Syriza gov-
ernment has become one of the most hawkish in the region. The 
pro-Israeli turn in Greece was initiated by Konstantinos Mitsotakis in 
the 1990s, then deepened by Simitis and George Papandreou. Syriza 
had promised to break off military cooperation with the Israelis. In the 
first seven months there were minor attempts at developing a certain 
independence in foreign policy, but in relations with Israel there was 
a discreet continuity. Now the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a 
statement disagreeing with the eu policy of labelling products from the 
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Occupied Territories. Tsipras visited Jerusalem and recognized it as the 
capital of Israel; even the Americans haven’t done that. In September 
2015 Greece took part in a military exercise on a scale unprecedented in 
the eastern Mediterranean, with Israel, Egypt, the us and Cyprus. It’s a 
strategic orientation: they’re panicking about the situation in the region 
and think that aligning themselves with the Americans and the Israelis 
provides some safety. This is what I mean by nihilism: Schäuble asked 
for pension cuts, for home repossessions by the banks; he didn’t ask for 
subservience to Netanyahu.
What lessons should the European left draw from Syriza’s experience?
First, that it’s impossible to fight austerity or neoliberalism within the 
framework of the existing monetary union, and, most likely, of the eu as 
such. A rupture is indispensable. Second, the political practice of radical-
left parties vitally needs to articulate parliamentary politics with popular 
mobilizations; when the second is lost, the first becomes weightless, 
and actually reinforces the ongoing collapse of representative politics. 
Third, a proper reinvention of a broad, anti-capitalist vision of society is 
needed—neither a return to the old recipes, nor a mythical tabula rasa. 
It was predictable that defeat in Greece would send a negative shock 
wave across the rest of Europe. Though there are other factors involved, 
I think it played a role in Podemos saying they won’t break with the euro, 
not even with the Stability Pact, and revising their position on the debt. 
Currently, they’re not even setting a break with austerity as a condition 
for collaboration at government level. Iglesias says that the point is to 
rise above the shoulder of psoe and orient the hand of social democracy 
to the left. The Portuguese have drawn a similar conclusion; there the 
impact of Syriza’s defeat is even more apparent. I can understand that 
the deal struck by the Left Bloc and the Portuguese Communist Party 
with the Socialists was to some extent a tactical move, because the right 
had lost its majority in parliament, and there was a demand to allow 
the Socialists to take over—otherwise the right would once again be in 
command. But it’s a fundamental mistake for formations of the radical 
left to agree to a line that is merely complementary to social democracy. 
We don’t need radical-left parties to make deals with social democracy 
to limit foreclosures, raise the minimum wage by €50, cancel some 
redundancies in the public sector, and so on. If we really think that’s 
the best we can get, we should operate within the framework of social 
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democracy, and try to obtain some concrete improvements. But for a 
political current that supposedly has an alternative vision for society, 
accepting this as the horizon can amount to giving up on that vision. 
That’s the danger that the remainder of the radical left faces in Europe 
now, after Syriza’s failed attempt: the danger of giving up on the very 
idea of more radical change. But not everyone draws the same conclu-
sions. Mélenchon has organized discussions in Paris about the need 
for a Plan B—I think he has drawn more correct conclusions from the 
Greek case, and denounced Tsipras’s capitulation. He is now talking 
openly about the necessity for all the parties of the European radical 
left to make alternative plans which do include the option of leaving 
the euro and preparation for full-scale confrontation. There is a similar 
conference in Madrid initiated by the left of Podemos—Anticapitalistas 
and other forces on the radical left in Spain, which also include part of 
the Catalan radical left, and so on. So, there are forces who are drawing 
the relevant conclusions.
The paradox of the Greek case is that, although it ended in disaster, at 
some moments it gave us a glimpse of what an alternative might be. 
The sequence of the referendum was vital in relaunching the process 
of popular radicalization. It showed a way to combine electoral success 
and popular mobilization. It was an important event: the first time a 
people has defiantly said ‘No’ to an ultimatum from Europe’s ruling 
powers, on such a scale. We should remain faithful to the meaning of 
that event and reject the dominant narrative, which asks us to pretend 
it never happened.
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